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I.  Introduction 
 
The past three decades have witnessed a considerable expansion in inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into China1, in tandem with China’s fast economic growth. Apart from a 
favorable investment environment, the strategic efforts made by the Chinese government are 
thought to have played an important role in inviting FDI, one being the establishment of 
investment promotion agencies. The first China Investment Promotion Agency (CIPA) was 
established in the 1980s to facilitate the promotion of foreign investment. Unlike special economic 
zones (SEZs), which use tax incentive to invite FDI, IPAs are local organizations aimed at 
assisting the investment activities of foreign investors, including both incumbents and newcomers. 
Even though a few empirical studies have attempted to examine the relationship between 
government policy and FDI in the context of China (Dean et al., 2009; Wang, 2013), none has 
focused on the impact of IPAs. 
Theoretically, IPAs are expected to raise FDI because compared with developed countries, 
developing countries lack detailed information on the prevailing business environment, and the 
cost of acquiring information is quite high (Harding and Javorcik, 2007). Several studies have 
empirically investigated IPAs’ influence on FDI in countries other than China. Morisset (2003) and 
Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004) use country-level data to indicate that the presence of IPAs 
exerts a positive influence, a hypothesis supported by Charlton and Davis (2006) together with 
Harding and Javorcik (2007). However, no research has used micro-level data, though such data 
can control firm heterogeneity and better capture the direct effect of how foreign firms react to 
incentives provided by IPAs. 
  This study contributes to the previous literature in several ways. To the best of my knowledge, it 
is the first paper to use micro-level data to analyze IPAs’ effect on attracting FDI in China2. Rather 
than focusing on the location choice of new entrants or on the amount of “greenfield” investment, 
this paper takes a different perspective by examining the so-called “agglomeration effect”3. Using 
advanced methodologies of instrumental variable and a sample selection model to alleviate the 
potential endogeneity problem of IPAs, the approach reveals that the impact of IPAs on attracting 
FDI is positive. The results also indicate that Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) firms are not 
as sensitive to the presence of IPAs in investment decision-making as for other non-HMT foreign 
firms, and IPAs have different impacts between low-tech and high-tech industries.  
     
 
II.  Estimation Strategy and Data 
 
Estimation strategy 
 
The baseline empirical specification in the firm-level analysis takes the following reduced form: 
 
  lnFDIict =α + β1IPAct + βi xit + βcwct + gt + ε ict         (1) 
 
  The dependent variable is the log of new fixed assets for firm i in city c at time t. I only focused 
on firms with foreign ownership confirmed by the actual foreign share in capital. Since 86 per cent 
of IPAs target investors that are already present in the host country (UNCTAD, 2001), I chose to 
focus on the incremental FDI, i.e. the investment of the existing investors, in this paper. IPA is a 
                                                            
1 By year 2011 inward FDI in China had reached US$712 billion, second only to that of the United States (World Invest Report, 2012). 
2 Amiti and Javorcik (2008), Liu et al. (2010) have applied firm-level data to investigate the determinants of entry of foreign investment in China. 
3 Agglomeration effect indicates that existing FDI attracts further FDI. Head et al. (1995), Head and Ries (1996) and Guimaraes et al. (2000) all 
verify this effect. 
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dummy variable that specifies whether the city has an IPA at time t4. Since there existed very few 
newly established IPAs during the analysis period (2002–2004), it is assumed that the city had an 
IPA either before or after 2004 when conducting the estimation 5 . xit is a vector of firm 
characteristics that might affect firm i’s decision-making on subsequent investment. To be 
consistent with previous firm-level research on the micro determinants of FDI, sales revenue, wage 
rate, and research and development (R&D) expenditure are included as control variables. 
Following Devereux and Rachel (1998), tax rate is also included. Export customs clearance time is 
added as a proxy for trade barriers. 
wct represents a vector of city characteristics, including non-policy characteristics and policy 
incentives. As for policy incentives other than IPAs, Cheng and Kwan (2000) prove the positive 
influence of the creation of SEZs6 on attracting FDI. Foreign firms located in certain SEZs, which 
had long been established before the establishment of IPAs, enjoy various treatment levels 
concerning tax reduction. It is likely that foreign firms attempt to establish their subsidiaries in 
areas with tax incentives7. This factor is controlled by extending the concept of the SEZ to create a 
new variable of the Investment Incentive Zone (IIZ), following Cho and Tung (1998). The action 
accords with the focus on each city instead of the entire province and follows the same 
methodology used to construct the IPA dummy. Year dummy gt is added to control the change 
over time. The error term captures all the unobserved elements that might affect the analysis.  
 
Econometric Concerns and Solutions 
 
The use of a random effects model alone is not a sufficient solution to the potential endogeneity 
problems that arise from two sources. The first source is reverse causality. However, it appears to 
be a minor concern in the model used here because the dependent variable is incremental FDI at 
the firm level, and it is unlikely to affect a  city’s decision to establish an IPA. Still, this 
possibility is addressed later for the sake of robustness check8. 
The second source of the endogeneity problem comes from the possibility that IPAs might 
“self-select” into some cities. This kind of bias can also be summarized as one of the omitted 
variable problems, which requires great care. Apart from the four special municipalities directly 
under the control of the central government (Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Chongqing), the 
development of IPAs has been uneven across China. Judging from the fact that most IPAs are 
clustered along the coastal areas (mainly South and East China) or located in the capital city of 
each province, I find that IPAs are more likely to be established in areas with relatively higher 
GDP per capita or with a better business environment. The criteria used to select cities for IPA 
establishment is not publicized. Thus, if unobserved city characteristics affect the criteria, they are 
correlated with foreign firms’ investment decisions, and the estimation of the IPA coefficient is 
likely to be biased.  
To address this second type of endogeneity, I employed a treatment-effect model. If a foreign 
firm is located in a city that has IPAs, it is defined as “treated”, otherwise as “control”. I modelled 
the establishment of IPA as a function of a vector of city level characteristics, such as GDP per 
capita, infrastructure investment, trade volume, etc. The investment decision of the firm can be 
modeled as a two-step procedure. I omitted the subscripts for simplicity.   
                                                            
4 Since every province already has the provincial IPAs, this study focuses on city-level IPAs only. And according to CIPA’s definition, it is 
assumed that city IPAs have jurisdiction over all the foreign firms located in that city.  
5 I also excluded IPAs set up during 2002-2004 for double check. 
6 See Cheng and Kwan (2000) for full description of the Zone. 
7 The new industry tax law of China has been applied since 2008. Thus the change of tax rate doesn’t affect my estimation. 
8 As argued by Cheng and Kwan (2000), apart from IPAs, FDI inflow can also drive up wage rate, R&D, and sales of the firm. Thus I used system 
GMM proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to correct for the possible estimation bias. The results remain consistent and are available upon 
request.   
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lnFDI =α + βipaIPA + βX + ε      (2) 
IPA* = δY + u                   (3) 
where  
 
IPA = 1, if IPA
* > 0, which means the city has at least one IPA
0, otherwise
⎧
⎨
⎩
 
 
X in Equation 2 is supposed to capture all the firm-level characteristics that are assumed to 
influence the foreign firm’s investment. In addition, Y in Equation 3 includes the determinants of 
IPA in the city level.  
  Different estimation methods are used depending on different assumptions on the relationship 
between ε  and u  in the above equations. It is possible that the unobserved micro-level elements 
are independent of the city-level factors that promote the construction of more IPAs, to be specific, 
ε ⊥ u . If this assumption holds, then the consistent estimation of βipa  can be obtained and I can 
apply corresponding estimation strategies such as control function9 or instrumental variable (IV)10 
regression. See Wooldridge (2010) for a detailed discussion. Recent application of the control 
function can be found in Petrin and Train (2010), and Liu et al. (2010). In contrast, it is also likely 
that some cities’ cultural advantage (e.g., Shanghai’s close business ties with Japanese partners) 
will lower the investment costs for some foreign firms, which can not be controlled using the 
information in the dataset. In the case when ε  is correlated with u , the conditional mean 
independence assumption is violated and the causal effect using the control function will be biased. 
Thus I have to resort to other methods, such as the Heckman two-stage sample selection model. In 
accordance with Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 21), I now assume that Equation 2 will take a more 
generalized form by allowing both observable and unobservable heterogeneity: 
 
lnFDI1 =α1 + β1X + ε1 , E(ε1 X) = 0   (4) 
lnFDI0 =α0 + β0X + ε0 ,E(ε0 X) = 0   (5) 
lnFDI = IPA*(lnFDI1 − lnFDI0 )     (6) 
 
when u in Equation 3 is correlated with ε1 and ε 0 above, it is shown that consistent estimation can 
be achieved by conducting the following OLS11: 
E(lnFDI X, IPA) = f (IPA,X)+ ρ1 ⋅ IPA ⋅
φ(δY )
Φ(δY ) + ρ0 ⋅(1− IPA) ⋅
φ(δY )
1−Φ(δY )      (7) 
where ρ1  is the correlation between u  and ε1 , ρ0 for u  and ε 0 . φ(⋅)  and Φ(⋅)  are the 
density and cumulative normal distribution respectively, which can be obtained by running 
Equation 3 using probit in the first step. By so doing the potential bias due to correlation between 
ε  and u (or selection-on-unobservables) can be alleviated. In practice I used the Heckman 
selection model as the benchmark model and other options as robustness check12. 
 
 
                                                            
9  Control function regression relies on conditional mean independence (CMI) assumption, which refers to the exogenous impact of the “treatment” 
on outcome lnFDI once firm characteristics X is controlled in this paper.  
10 Here I am referring to the standard IV models such as two-stage least square (2SLS). 
11 See Wooldridge (2010, P949). 
12 I chose “ivtreatreg” when running the estimation, as suggested by Cerulli (2014). By changing the option of model type, it can fit into IV models 
or Heckman selection model flexibly. 
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Data   
 
The data on three types of variables examined in this paper—the ipadummy, firm characteristics, 
and city-level factors—were collected from three main sources. A list of 141 city-level IPAs was 
constructed by combining two sources. To identify the several city-level IPAs not listed on the 
“Invest in China” website, I made reference to the information of the China Council for 
International Investment Promotion (hereafter referred as CCIIP)13.   
Data regarding firm characteristics was taken from the China 2005 Investment Climate Survey 
of World Bank. The survey reports three-year balanced panel data covering all manufacturing 
industries for the period 2002–2004, while several variables remained constant throughout this 
period, e.g., ownership share. The data was originally collected by administering a questionnaire to 
12,400 firms in 123 cities throughout China, ranging from company information to to financing, to 
be answered qualitatively or quantitatively. When it comes to the ownership of the firms, 990 are 
HMT-invested, 1398 are other foreign-invested, and 365 are foreign–domestic shared firms. 
  “New fixed asset investment” is used to represent FDI volume; sales revenue is set to equal the 
sum of “core business” and “other business income”; R&D is defined as the annual value invested 
in the R&D department while the wage rate is equal to the average wage of a permanent worker. 
The tax rate equals the income tax/total sales revenue. I assume it is reasonable to have negative 
figures for tax rate in the dataset because in China, if a foreign company operates at a loss in a 
given year, the loss will be deducted from the total tax liability of the following year. All variables 
are presented in the units of thousand yuan14 and “customs clearance time” measured by day is 
used as a proxy for trade time.  
   
Table 1.  Statistical Summary 
Variables N Mean S.D. 
ln_FDI 7963 9.804423 2.17919 
ipadummy 36921 0.4427562 0.4967191 
iizdummy 36921 0.3701958 0.4828635 
trade_time 36921 1.872284 5.471339 
ln_sale 36857 10.71119 2.050383 
ln_taxra 21514 -3.167929 1.539815 
ln_wage_rate 36921 -0.1160097 0.4858685 
ln_rd 20256 5.960377 2.609501 
ln_frei 36721 8.646856 0.8609946 
ln_city_gdp 36821 15.50882 0.8553658 
ln_gdp_per 36821 9.352639 0.6857158 
ln_trade_vol 36821 14.52381 1.350243 
ln_infra_inv 36024 11.16436 1.528503 
ln_edu_exp 36326 10.54858 1.261787 
ln_ave_wage 36426 9.305477 0.4850426 
ln_post 36326 9.837893 0.9748189 
ln_tele 36326 11.89652 1.184367 
ln_tot_save 36426 14.60622 1.258158 
Note: See Appendix Table A1 for the detailed description of the variables. 
 
  Data on city-level factors was extracted from the Chinese Statistical Year Book. Idiosyncratic 
city characteristics include: GDP per capita, average wage for workers, total annual savings, total 
expenditure for postal mail and telecommunications, and expenditure on education, etc. 
                                                            
13 The CCIIP website does not list the establishment year for all city-level IPAs. However, as a city usually has either multiple IPAs or no IPAs, the 
available information is sufficient for me to determine whether the city had IPAs during 2002-2004. 
14 The unit for wage rate is yuan. I divided it by 1000 to make it consistent with others. 
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Meanwhile the IIZ dummy was constructed based on the information collected from the “Invest in 
China Agency” website. Table 1 presents the statistical summary of the main variables. 
 
III.  Estimation Results 
 
Table 2.  The amount of FDI (logarithm) by year 
 Control (ipadummy=0) Treated (ipadummy=1)  
Year No. of firms Mean No. of firms Mean Mean-difference 
2002 1001 8.988336 1651 10.05577 1.067434 
2003 1002 9.187138 1652 10.21541 1.028272 
2004 1002 9.302308 1655 10.31477 1.012462 
Source: Enterprise Survey, World Bank. 
 
The simple statistical analysis can give us some intuition concerning the potential impact of IPAs. 
As shown in Table 2, when a comparison of incremental investment is conducted between 
IPA-supervised foreign firms and non-IPA-supervised firms, it is easy to identify the difference. 
Even though the investment of the control group also witnesses a stable annual growth, the average 
amount of investment of the treated group is higher than that of the comparison group.    
 
Table 3.  Estimation Result 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Baseline Baseline IV (OLS) IV (2SLS) Heckman 
VARIABLES lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI lnFDI 
ipadummy 0.262** 0.316** 1.349*** 1.094*** 0.765*** 
 (0.119) (0.133) (0.206) (0.171) (0.224) 
trade_time 0.00201 0.00169 0.0116 0.0221** 0.0213** 
 (0.00622) (0.00600) (0.00851) (0.0107) (0.00968) 
ln_sale 0.646*** 0.642*** 0.946*** 0.908*** 0.849*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0281) (0.0287) (0.0289) 
ln_tax_rate -0.00834 -0.0126 0.00133 0.0191 -0.000665 
 (0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0296) (0.0309) (0.0308) 
ln_wage_rate -0.0207 -0.0379 -0.324*** -0.322*** -0.218*** 
 (0.0534) (0.0536) (0.0703) (0.0717) (0.0745) 
ln_rd 0.0714*** 0.0744*** 0.0524*** 0.0591*** 0.0339* 
 (0.0152) (0.0154) (0.0192) (0.0202) (0.0204) 
ρ1     -0.0911 
     (0.189) 
ρ0     0.599*** 
     (0.129) 
City 
characteristics No Yes 
   
Random Effects Yes Yes    
Observations 2,808 2,771 2,771 2,771 2,573 
Notes: Baseline city characteristics include iizdummy, freight, gdp_perca, infra_invest, edu_exp, average_wage. 
For column (3)(4)(5), the first stage city characteristics are the same as the ones used in baseline estimation. 
Year dummies are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  The estimation results using Equation 1 confirm the aforementioned hypothesis. In Table 3, the 
first column shows the results of RE model without city characteristics. ipadummy is positively 
significant and increases the firm’s investment by 26%. This verifies the role of IPAs in attracting 
more FDI into the region, which is consistent with previous literature. Meanwhile tax_rate and 
wage_rate have the expected sign, though they are not statistically convincing. The positive signs 
of Sales and R&D indicate that these variables positively affect existing foreign firms’ decision on 
their subsequent investment. The second column shows the results when city-specific factors are 
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added as control variables (γ ct in Equation 1). ipadummy remains positively significant
15, though 
the magnitude increases by more than 5%. The remainder of the control variables shows a similar 
tendency as in the first set of specifications. 
  Columns (3) and (4) show the results using IV methods. Both apply to probit ipadummy on 
covariates Y, as in Equation 3. It shows that the coefficient of ipadummy varies by 25% but its 
positive significance remains. The reliability of this finding is strengthened by the result of using 
the Heckman two-step selection model, as presented in the 5th column—even when potential bias 
is controlled, IPAs still, to a great extent, increase the investment amounts of the existing foreign 
firms. Compared with the baseline result, all three models lead to an upward estimation of the 
coefficient for ipadummy despite the fluctuation, which indicates that the unobserved city factors 
(those entering the selection equation) might be negatively correlated with foreign firms’ 
investment decision. To confirm the existence of the selection bias, I calculated average treatment 
effect (ATE), ATE on the treated (ATET), and ATE on the nontreated (ATENT) for (3), (4) and 
(5) respectively16. In this paper, ATE refers to the impact of IPAs on all foreign firms while ATET 
measures the impact of IPAs on foreign firms that located in the cities with IPAs.  
As Fig. 1 indicates, all three models follow a similar distribution of treatment effect. ATE in all 
cases are approximately subject to normal distribution and the range is in between ATET and 
ATENT. This predicts that the untreated foreign firms would have invested more, had they been 
assisted by IPAs.  
 
Fig. 1.  Distribution of ATE, ATET and ATENT for different models 
 
                                                            
15 I tried various combinations of the city variables. For example, I replaced gdp_percapia with city_gdp, tele_expenditure with post_expenditure 
and add total_savings. All these do not change the significance of IPA, thought the coefficient of IPA varies from 30%-32%. 
16 ATET=E[(lnFDI1i-lnFDI0i)|IPAi=1].    
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After running the Heckman model, I tested the hypothesis of no correlation between unobserved 
city and firm characteristics by examining the null H0 : ρ1= ρ0  = 0. The result rejects the null, 
implying the appropriateness of using this specification 17 . Next I performed the simple 
difference-in-mean test by putting the ATE results in all models together (Table 4). Based on the 
consistent results, the conclusion can be drawn that IPAs do promote foreign firms to invest more.  
 
Table 4.  T test for ATE 
Variable ttest probit_ols probit_2sls heckit 
ipadummy 1.03*** 1.35*** 1.09*** 0.76*** 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
IV.  Further Issues 
 
Does the origin of FDI matter? 
 
According to National Bureau of Statistics of China, HMT firms have been the leading investors in 
China since the opening-up reform, with these regions comprising more than half of China’s 
inward FDI during 1990-2004. Because of this skewed allocation of FDI, I would like to take a 
step further to examine whether IPAs have different impact on investors of different origin. To do 
this, samples were divided into HMT and non-HMT subgroups, and Equation 1 was re-estimated 
for each group. Such type of categorization has been used in previous studies (Lin et al., 2009; Ito 
et al., 2012). The results are presented in Table 5. IPAs clearly play a positive role in attracting 
non-HMT foreign firms to invest more in China, whereas their impact on HMT firms is not as 
obvious. This indicates that non-HMT foreign firms benefit more from IPAs’ assistance since they 
have less access to local information than HMT firms do (such as quality of suppliers). 
 
Table 5.  Comparison between HMT and Non-HMT firms 
 HMT group  Non-HMT group 
Model OLS Heckman  OLS Heckman 
VARIABLES lnFDI lnFDI  lnFDI lnFDI 
ipadummy 0.210 0.508  0.355* 0.834*** 
 (0.189) (0.354)  (0.181) (0.281) 
trade_time -0.00512 0.0189  0.00877 0.0250* 
 (0.00520) (0.0136)  (0.00960) (0.0144) 
ln_sale 0.619*** 0.895***  0.656*** 0.823*** 
 (0.0507) (0.0455)  (0.0351) (0.0389) 
ln_tax_rate -0.0304 0.00150  -0.00627 -0.0227 
 (0.0231) (0.0469)  (0.0153) (0.0422) 
ln_wage_rate -0.00703 -0.425***  -0.0471 -0.0952 
 (0.0828) (0.126)  (0.0654) (0.0964) 
ln_rd 0.127*** 0.101***  0.0478*** -0.00297 
 (0.0265) (0.0312)  (0.0181) (0.0270) 
Observations 859 856  1,912 1,645 
Notes: City chracteristics include iizdummy, freight, gdp_perca, edu_exp, infra_invest, average_wage.  
Random effect option is used for OLS estimation. Year dummies are included.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Does the industry matter?  
 
Liu and Daly (2011) explore the determinants of FDI inflow into different industries, namely 
high-tech and low-tech industries. The motivation behind their study is the great increase in FDI in 
the manufacturing industry in reaction to China’s Open Door policy. In their paper, it shows that 
                                                            
17 Since ivtreatreg does not provide post-estimation test option when “IV” model is chosen, I used ivreg2 to re-estimate and run endogeneity test. 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistics show that ipadummy is not exogenous. 
9 
 
 
 
between 1997 and 2008, FDI in the manufacturing industry represented 63.2 per cent of all utilized 
FDI in China and reached US $49.89 billion in 2008. Since China is undergoing the transition from 
an agriculturally centered society to an industrialized country, the desired sector for FDI inflow has 
been shifting from traditional low-tech industries to high-tech manufacturing industries. As 
realized by the Chinese government, technology advancement is an inevitable factor in a country’s 
economic growth. Thus it would be interesting to determine whether government policy has had its 
intended effect. 
 
Table 6.  Comparison between high-tech and low-tech firms 
 High-tech  Low-tech 
Model OLS Heckman  OLS Heckman 
VARIABLES lnFDI lnFDI  lnFDI lnFDI 
ipadummy 0.408** 1.101***  0.264 -0.0817 
 (0.180) (0.273)  (0.221) (0.467) 
trade_time 0.00871 0.0281**  -0.00914 0.00669 
 (0.00773) (0.0127)  (0.00701) (0.0171) 
ln_sale 0.640*** 0.814***  0.646*** 0.869*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0347)  (0.0487) (0.0614) 
ln_tax_rate -0.00320 -0.0238  -0.0253 -0.0629 
 (0.0150) (0.0374)  (0.0248) (0.0658) 
ln_wage_rate -0.0697 -0.203**  0.0297 -0.0511 
 (0.0563) (0.0916)  (0.137) (0.192) 
ln_rd 0.0752*** 0.0173  0.0773*** 0.122*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0248)  (0.0205) (0.0425) 
Observations 1,731 1,399  1,040 1,014 
Notes: City chracteristics include iizdummy, freight, gdp_perca, edu_exp, infra_invest, average_wage.  
RE option is included in OLS estimation. Year dummies are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
According to Holz (2013), the sectoral classification in China has undergone four periods of 
reform. In consideration of the period of estimation, GB2002 (guobiao in Chinese, representing the 
standard regulated in year 2002) was used for conducting further analysis. After all 30 industries 
have been classified as either low-tech or high-tech industries based on the classification in Liu and 
Daly (2011), regression was performed on each subgroup in order to determine the impact of the 
presence of IPAs. 
The estimation results in Table 6 provide strong evidence that IPAs are more successful in 
encouraging high-tech foreign firms to increase the amount of their investment, which indicates the 
potential “screening” function of IPAs to invite foreign investors with higher quality. This is in 
accordance with the finding in UNCTAD (2001, P20). Nevertheless, future study should take a 
step further to look into the specific industries which are “preferred” to others, as well as the reason 
behind this phenomena.  
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper is to address the research gap regarding the empirical study of how a 
government policy, namely IPAs, can affect inward FDI into China. Despite data limitations, I 
attempted different methodologies to correct for the potential econometric problem, and showed 
that the presence of IPAs has a significantly positive effect on attracting incremental FDI into 
China. This indicates that IPAs, as an FDI-inviting policy tool, do fulfill their expected 
responsibilities. Consistent with previous literature, other factors such as sales volume, R&D, 
wage rate, and tax rate are also found to be important in the decision-making process of foreign 
investors. 
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  The results also confirm that IPAs play a more important role in encouraging non-HMT foreign 
companies than HMT firms to invest in China. Owing to the advantage of location, HMT firms 
are familiar with the business patterns in mainland China and have easier access to resource 
information, which thus increases the ease with which they make investment decisions, regardless 
of the assistance of IPAs. As such, policies regarding IPAs and similar entities have only slight 
impact on HMT firms. Based on this finding and on a consideration of the close connection 
between HMT firms and China, as well as HMT firms’ great influence on the mainland in terms 
of employment, technological exchange, and even cultural communication, the Chinese 
government should develop more creative policy tools that will allow it to work more closely with 
its HMT partners. 
  Lastly, it is shown that IPAs are more efficient in increasing the investment of foreign firms in 
high-tech industries compared with low-tech industries. One possible explanation for this is that 
the Chinese government uses IPAs to screen FDI, as advanced technology is preferred to promote 
industrial productivity.  
  Due to insufficient information, neither the quality of IPAs nor the impact of firm heterogeneity 
can be examined. Further study should thus be undertaken to determine the best means of 
evaluating IPAs in terms of their qualities and functions.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1.  Description of the variables 
Variable Description Source 
y (FDI) new fixed assets for firm i (1000 yuan) Enterprise Survey 
ipadummy whether the city has ipa or not CCIIP 
iizdummy whether the city is iiz or not Invest in China 
Wage Rate average wage rate for firm i (yuan) Enterprise Survey 
Sale sales revenue for firm i (1000 yuan) Enterprise Survey 
Taxra tax rate for firm i Enterprise Survey 
RD R&D expenditure for firm i (1000 yuan) Enterprise Survey 
trade_time customs clearance time for firm i (days) Enterprise Survey 
gdp_percapita gdp per capita of the city (yuan) China Statistical Yearbook 
city_gdp GDP of the city (10,000 yuan) China Statistical Yearbook 
infra_inv infrastructure investment value of the city (10,000 yuan) China Statistical Yearbook 
frei freight volume of the city (10,000 ton) China Statistical Yearbook 
trade_volume trade revenue of the city (10,000 yuan) China Statistical Yearbook 
ave_wage average wage of the city (yuan) China Statistical Yearbook 
tot_save total savings of the city by the end of year (10,000 yuan) China Statistical Yearbook 
edu_exp education expenditure of the city (10,000 yuan) China Statistical Yearbook 
post total postal expenditure of the city (10,000 yuan) China Statistical Yearbook 
tele total telecommunication expenditure of the city (10,000 yuan) China Statistical Yearbook 
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Table A2.  Cities with IPAs in China (by 2009) 
Province City Province City Province City 
anhui hefei hebei shijiazhuang shandong jinan 
anhui wuhu hebei tangshan shandong qingdao 
beijing beijing heilongjiang haerbing shandong weihai 
chongqing chongqing henan zhengzhou shandong yantai 
fujian fuzhou hubei hankou shanghai shanghai 
fujian xiamen hubei qianjiang shanxi1 taiyuan 
gansu lanzhou hubei wuhan shanxi3 xi’an 
guangdong dongguan hunan changsha sichuan chengdu 
guangdong foshan jiangsu nanjing sichuan yibin 
guangdong guangzhou jiangsu nantong tianjin tianjin 
guangdong huizhou jiangsu suzhou xinjiang wulumuqi 
guangdong shenzhen jiangsu taicang xizang lasa 
guangdong zhanjiang jiangsu lianyungang yunnan kunming 
guangdong zhuhai jiangxi nanchang zhejiang cixi 
guangxi nanning jilin changchun zhejiang hangzhou 
guizhou guiyang liaoning dalian zhejiang ningbo 
hainan haikou liaoning shenyang zhejiang wenzhou 
hebei baoding neimenggu huhehaote zhejiang xiaoshan 
hebei langfang ningxia yinchuan   
hebei qinhuangdao qinghai xining   
Notes: 58 cities in total. shanxi1 is the province in North China. The capital city is Tai Yuan. While shangxi3 is the 
province in North-West China. The capital city is Xi’an. 
 
 
